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I. INTRODUCTION 
Physicians or consumers of pharmaceutical products can file 
complaints with the manufacturing company or with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to report adverse events that occurred 
after use. When the FDA receives the complaint, the agency may 
decide that an investigation into the drug’s safety is warranted.1 
Announcements of FDA investigations into drug safety may result in 
a drop in the manufacturing company’s stock price.2 Prior to 2006, 
when consumers complained directly to the company, homeopathic 
drug companies were not required to report these complaints to the 
FDA.3 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano4 addresses whether a drug 
company violated securities-law disclosure requirements by failing to 
disclose these complaints to its shareholders. Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19345 and Securities Exchange 
 
* 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Brief for Petitioners at 22–23, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. 
Aug. 20, 2010). 
 2. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2010) (“Such regulatory 
attention can have a significant impact on a drug’s commercial success and litigation risk.”). 
 3. Brief for Respondents at 9, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. 
Nov. 5, 2010). In 2006, Congress enacted a statute requiring the manufacturers of homeopathic 
drugs to report serious adverse events to the FDA. The Dietary Supplement and 
Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §379aa (West 2011). 
 4. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-1156 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2010). 
 5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2011). 
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Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-56 require corporations to disclose 
material information to their shareholders. Matrixx Initiatives 
concerns whether adverse-event reports are material information 
under this rule when the reports do not demonstrate a statistically 
significant link between drug use and adverse events.7 
II. FACTS 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx) is a pharmaceutical company 
whose wholly-owned subsidiary, Zicam, LLC, produces and markets a 
homeopathic cold remedy called Zicam Cold Remedy (Zicam).8 
Zicam can be administered intranasally through a spray or gel, and its 
active ingredient is zinc gluconate.9 Prior to placing the drug on the 
market, Matrixx had conducted two clinical trials of Zicam with no 
indication of any statistically significant safety issues.10 In 1999, a 
doctor reported to Matrixx that his patient had developed anosmia, 
the loss of smell, after using Zicam intranasally.11 The doctor also 
informed Matrixx that studies had shown that the intranasal 
application of zinc compounds can produce anosmia and offered to 
study a possible link between Zicam and anosmia.12 In 2002, Matrixx’s 
Vice President of Research and Development, Timothy Clarot 
(Clarot), contacted a scientist whose patient had complained to 
 
 6. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011). 
 7. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at i. 
 8. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx I), No. CV 04 0886 PHX MHM, 2005 
WL 3970117, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005), rev’d, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010). 
 9. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (Matrixx II), 585 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 10. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 5. While homeopathic drugs must meet strength, 
quality, and purity standards, the FDA does not subject them to the rigorous safety and efficacy 
requirements that other medicinal drugs must meet. Conditions Under Which Homeopathic 
Drugs May Be Marketed, FDA Compliance Policy Guide § 400.400 (1995), http://www.fda.gov/ 
ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm074360.htm. Statistical 
signficance can be summarized as follows: 
To assess statistical significance in the medical context, a 
researcher begins with the ‘null hypothesis,’ i.e., that there is no 
relationship between the drug and the adverse effect. The 
researcher calculates a ‘p-value,’ which is the probability that the 
association observed in the study would have occurred even if 
there were in fact no link between the drug and the adverse 
effect. If that p-value is lower than the ‘significance level’ selected 
for the study, then the results can be deemed statistically 
significant. 
Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 13. 
 11. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170. 
 12. Id. 
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Matrixx of anosmia after using Zicam.13 The scientist subsequently 
sent Clarot information about polio studies from the 1930s linking 
zinc sulfate to anosmia.14 Clarot asked the scientist if she would 
participate in animal studies of Zicam, but she declined.15 In 2003, Dr. 
Bruce Jafek prepared a presentation to the American Rhinologic 
Society studying ten patients who took Zicam prior to losing their 
sense of smell.16 Matrixx informed Dr. Jafek that he could not use the 
names “Matrixx” or “Zicam” in his presentation17 and asked for more 
information about the possible link.18 
Despite receiving notifications of a potential link between using 
Zicam and developing anosmia, Matrixx “continued to make positive 
statements regarding Matrixx’s growth and revenue and Zicam’s 
safety” without disclosing the possible link to shareholders.19 In its 
press releases and an earnings conference call, Matrixx touted 
Zicam’s potential for growth and efficacy.20 In a filing with the SEC, 
Matrixx warned of the risk and consequences of possible product-
liability litigation, but did not disclose that a lawsuit had been filed 
already alleging that Zicam caused loss of smell.21 
On January 30, 2004, a news article reported that three lawsuits 
had been filed against Matrixx and that the FDA was investigating a 
possible link between Zicam and anosmia.22 Over the next two days, 
Matrixx’s stock price fell from $13.55 to $11.97.23 Matrixx responded 
by issuing a press release declaring that “statements alleging that 
intranasal Zicam products cause anosmia (loss of smell) are 
completely unfounded and misleading.”24 The company also stated 
that the drug’s safety and efficacy had been established in two clinical 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 6. 
 15. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170. 
 16. Id. at 1171. 
 17. Id. While the Ninth Circuit appeared to believe that Matrixx’s refusal to grant 
permission for Jafek to use the name “Zicam” in his presentation lends support to Matrixx’s 
having the requisite scienter under Rule 10b-5, id. at 1182, Matrixx’s refusal might have been 
merely a strategic precaution protecting its trademark from possible bad publicity or slander. 
 18. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 7. 
 19. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Matrixx I), No. CV 04 0886 PHX MHM, 2005 
WL 3970117, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005), rev’d, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
130 S. Ct. 3411 (2010). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1172. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1173 (quoting Press Release, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2004)). 
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trials.25 The next day, Matrixx’s stock price rose to $13.40.26 On 
February 6, Good Morning America reported on the possible link 
between Zicam and anosmia, and the stock price fell even more 
dramatically—from $13.05 on February 5 to $9.94 on February 6.27 
Matrixx again denied the allegations that Zicam caused anosmia in a 
press release, reiterating that the drug had been tested in two clinical 
trials without any reports of anosmia.28 In another SEC filing a few 
weeks later, however, Matrixx stated that a panel of scientists had 
concluded that “‘insufficient scientific evidence [was available] at this 
time to determine if zinc gluconate, when used as recommended, 
affects a person’s ability to smell.’”29 
In April 2004, Siracusano brought a class action suit against 
Matrixx under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA).30 The PSLRA permits private individuals to sue on behalf 
of all who invested in a particular company during a stated period of 
time to enforce federal securities laws.31 Siracusano sued on behalf of 
all investors in Matrixx between October 22, 2003, and February 6, 
2004 (the Class Period).32 Siracusano alleged that Matrixx violated 
Rule 10b-5 by not disclosing the risk that Zicam causes anosmia and 
by issuing false and misleading statements.33 The district court granted 
Matrixx’s motion to dismiss and Siracusano appealed.34 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, holding that materiality 
under Rule 10b-5 does not require statistical significance, and thus 
Siracusano had “sufficiently pled materiality to survive dismissal.”35 In 
June 2009, several years after this litigation began and after the Class 
Period, the FDA issued a warning letter to Matrixx stating that Zicam 
might pose a safety risk to consumers.36 
 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1174. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (quoting Form 8-K Filing, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (Feb. 19, 2004)). 
 30. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77–78 (West 2010). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1170. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1177. 
 35. Id. at 1183. 
 36. Id. at 1169 n.1. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implements 
a “‘philosophy of full disclosure’”37 and authorizes the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to promulgate rules prohibiting “manipulative 
or deceptive” practices “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.”38 Under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful to “make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”39 To 
prove a violation, a plaintiff must show “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss 
causation, and (5) economic loss.”40 As the district court dismissed the 
case based on Siracusano’s failure to allege sufficient materiality and 
scienter, only these elements are at issue in this case.41 Under the 
PSLRA, Congress codified a private right of action for violations of 
Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) and established heightened 
pleading requirements.42 The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to identify 
and explain each misleading statement and allege facts “giving rise to 
a strong inference” of scienter.43 
A. Materiality 
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,44 the Supreme Court 
clarified the standard for determining whether an omission of fact is 
material in federal securities law cases.45 TSC Industries concerned 
Securities Exchange Act section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9, which 
prohibit the omission of material facts in proxy statements.46 In TSC 
Industries, the Court balanced the purpose of the proxy regulations—
to encourage corporate management to disclose pertinent 
 
 37. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)). 
 38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2011). 
 39. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011). 
 40. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 41. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1177. 
 42. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320–21 (2007); Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77–78 (West 2010). 
 43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West 2010). 
 44. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 45. Id. at 443. 
 46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011). 
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information to keep shareholders informed in their investment 
decisions47—against the concern that disclosures could hurt, rather 
than help, shareholders in some situations.48 For example, in its 
attempt to reduce potential liability, management might over-disclose 
and “bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a 
result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.”49 The 
Court thus held that the appropriate standard of materiality requires 
“a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”50 
The Supreme Court applied the materiality standard set out in 
TSC Industries to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.51 Basic Inc. addressed whether a preliminary merger 
discussion was material under Rule 10b-5.52 In that case, Basic Inc., a 
publicly traded company, had publicly denied its involvement in 
merger negotiations even though its officers and directors met with 
another company about a possible merger during that time.53 After 
the merger was approved, former shareholders who sold their shares 
after Basic’s denials sued the company alleging that its statements 
violated Rule 10b-5.54 
The Basic Court expressly adopted the TSC Industries test for 
determining materiality under Rule 10b-5.55 The Court settled on this 
“highly fact-dependent probability/magnitude” test as the correct 
approach to determining the materiality of “contingent or speculative 
information or events,” such as merger negotiations.56 Emphasizing 
that the significance of the information is necessary to a finding of 
materiality, the Court noted that it is insufficient to find merely that 
the information was false or incomplete.57 In rejecting a bright-line 
rule, the Court emphasized that materiality requires “an inherently 
fact-specific finding” and that although such a rule might be easy to 
 
 47. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 448–49. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988). 
 52. Id. at 226. 
 53. Id. at 227. 
 54. Id. at 227–28. 
 55. Id. at 232–33, 237. 
 56. Id. at 238, 239 n.16. 
 57. Id. at 238. 
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apply, it is always over or underinclusive.58 The Court reiterated that 
materiality requires an assessment of the facts and rejected “confining 
[it] to a rigid formula.”59 
B. Scienter 
The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead facts that give rise to a 
“strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.”60 In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,61 the Supreme 
Court clarified the meaning of “strong inference” in response to a 
split among the circuit courts.62 The Tellabs Court held that when 
determining whether allegations provide a strong inference, courts 
must view them as a whole and “consider plausible nonculpable 
explanations” as well.63 Most importantly, the Court held that a 
complaint will allege sufficient scienter only where the facts give rise 
to an inference of scienter as “cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference.”64 
IV. HOLDING 
In Matrixx Initiatives, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
erred in relying on a statistical significance standard to reject, as a 
matter of law, Siracusano’s allegations of materiality and scienter 
under Rule 10b-5.65 It concluded that requiring a standard of 
statistical significance in the materiality determination would 
contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic.66 The Basic Court 
stated that assessing materiality involves a “fact-specific inquiry” and 
rejected the application of a “bright-line rule” to materiality 
determinations.67 As a result, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
dismissing a case based solely on the failure of the plaintiff to plead 
statistical significance would cut against Basic by both enforcing a 
bright-line rule and violating the principle that the trier of fact should 
 
 58. Id. at 233, 236. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 2010). 
 61. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 62. Id. at 322. 
 63. Id. at 323–24. 
 64. Id. at 324. 
 65. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (Matrixx II), 585 F.3d 1167, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
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assess materiality.68 The Ninth Circuit held that there is no statistical 
significance requirement to state a claim of material omission, and 
thus Siracusano’s failure to allege statistical significance would not 
bar a trier of fact from finding that Matrixx’s omissions were 
material.69 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit conducted a fact-specific inquiry to 
decide whether a reasonable investor would have considered 
information about the possible link between Zicam and anosmia 
significant.70 In making this determination, the court considered that 
physicians reported the user complaints, that Matrixx knew of studies 
demonstrating a link between intranasal application of zinc 
compounds and development of anosmia, that Matrixx was aware of 
case studies indicating that patients developed anosmia after using 
Zicam, and that lawsuits against Matrixx alleging that Zicam causes 
anosmia were pending.71 In light of these facts, the court held that 
Siracusano adequately alleged that Matrixx’s nondisclosure of 
adverse-event reports was material.72 
The Ninth Circuit also held that the facts pled in the complaint 
enabled a reasonable person to infer that Matrixx had the requisite 
scienter.73 Despite no indication that the adverse-event reports were 
statistically significant, the court determined that “the inference of 
scienter is ‘cogent and at least as compelling’ as any ‘plausible non-
culpable explanation[]’ for [Matrixx’s] conduct.”74 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Matrixx’s (Petitioner’s) Argument 
Matrixx argues that the adverse-event reports it received are not 
material and that no strong inference of deceit can be made because 
Siracusano’s complaint does not assert that these reports are 
statistically significant. Without statistical significance, nothing 
 
 
 68. Matrixx II, 585 F.3d at 1183. 
 69. Id. at 1179–80. 
 70. Id. at 1179. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1179–80. 
 73. Id. at 1183. 
 74. Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)). 
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indicates a causal relationship, and thus Siracusano failed to 
sufficiently allege materiality and scienter.75 
First, Matrixx claims that the complaints it received and failed to 
disclose during the Class Period are not material within the meaning 
of SEC Rule 10b-5.76 In effect, Matrixx argues that no reasonable 
investor would consider adverse-event reports to “‘significantly alter[] 
the total mix of information’” available, unless they indicate that the 
drug users’ incidence of adverse events is statistically significant as 
compared to non-drug users’ incidence of adverse events.77 As 
adverse-event reports include “any anecdotal report that the user of a 
drug experienced an adverse event at some point during or following 
the use of that drug” and they are “inherently unreliable,” such 
reports do not show a causal relationship between drug use and the 
adverse event.78 Additionally, people with the common cold, Zicam’s 
target population, are more likely to develop anosmia in the first 
place.79 This increased incidence suggests that even if Zicam users’ 
rate of adverse events is higher than that of the general population, 
this could be due to preexisting illness.80 
Matrixx argues that compelling the disclosure of adverse-event 
reports, absent some statistically significant evidence of a causal 
relationship, would “inundate[e] the market with useless, trivial, and 
even affirmatively misleading information, which will only undermine 
reasoned investment decisionmaking.”81 Since the reports provide 
only unreliable and speculative information, reasonable investors 
would not use them to make investment decisions.82 Furthermore, to 
avoid potential liability for securities fraud, pharmaceutical 
companies will react by disclosing all adverse-event reports.83 This will 
force investors to sift through unnecessary and unreliable information 
when making their investment decisions without providing any 
reasonable way for them to determine when products face legitimate 
safety concerns.84 By inundating consumers with adverse-event 
 
 75. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
 76. Id. at 15. 
 77. Id. at 26 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988)). 
 78. Id. at 17, 20. 
 79. Id. at 15. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 26. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 29–30. 
 84. Id. 
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reports—thus hiding truly important information in a sea of 
insignificant and trivial information—this type of compelled 
disclosure would undermine the purpose of the materiality 
requirement.85 
Second, Matrixx maintains that investors care about the existence 
of a causal relationship between drug use and adverse-health events, 
which are not speculative and are unreliable allegations of a link. 
Statistically significant evidence of causation must be required before 
a company discloses adverse-event reports.86 Scientists use statistical 
significance to measure the degree of association between two events, 
or put differently, whether two events “‘occur together more 
frequently than one would expect by chance.’”87 Courts also use 
statistical significance in some legal contexts, such as product liability 
and toxic torts, to provide evidence of causation.88 Because statistical 
significance distinguishes between the random coincidence of two 
events and a nonrandom association between those events, this 
standard “defines” what information is relevant to a reasonable 
investor.89 
According to Matrixx, relying on a statistical significance standard 
for materiality would provide guidance both for investors in making 
investment decisions related to product-safety risks, and for 
companies about what information they are obligated to disclose.90 
Other than this standard, “there is no intelligible basis” for 
understanding when the drug, and not other factors, causes adverse 
events.91 To sufficiently plead the materiality of omitted facts, a 
plaintiff should be required to allege facts demonstrating a 
statistically significant increase in the incidence of adverse events 
reported by drug users over the incidence of adverse events in the 
population suffering from the target condition.92 The complaint should 
fail as a matter of law because Siracusano did not allege that 
consumer complaints showed a statistically significant increase 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 32–33. 
 87. Id. at 34 (quoting Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 354–58 (2d ed. 
2000)). 
 88. Id. at 36–37. 
 89. Id. at 43. 
 90. Id. at 44. 
 91. Id. at 49. 
 92. Id. at 42. 
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between the rate of anosmia among the general population or cold-
sufferers and the rate among Zicam users.93 
In addition to failing to adequately allege materiality, Matrixx 
argues that Siracusano did not sufficiently plead scienter.94 The 
complaint does not plead facts that give rise to a strong inference of 
an intention to deceive, that is, an inference that is “‘cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from 
the facts alleged.’”95 First, because adverse-event reports generally are 
unreliable and provide speculative information, one cannot infer that 
Matrixx believed this information was material and warranted 
disclosure.96 Second, because the adverse-event reports received by 
Matrixx do not show a statistically significant increase in anosmia 
among Zicam users compared to cold-sufferers in general, an 
inference that Matrixx had the requisite scienter is not as compelling 
as other inferences.97 In fact, the “most obvious inference” is that 
Matrixx did not disclose the adverse-event reports because it did not 
believe they “indicate[d] anything meaningful about adverse reactions 
to [the] use of Zicam.”98 Therefore, Siracusano’s complaint failed to 
sufficiently allege the presence of scienter.99 
B. Siracusano’s (Respondent’s) Arguments and Supporting Arguments 
by the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Siracusano argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that statistical significance is not required to 
allege the materiality of omitted adverse-event reports. A finding of 
materiality in securities-fraud cases requires a factual inquiry.100 
Requiring a statistical significance standard would impose the type of 
bright-line rule that the Supreme Court rejected in Basic.101 
Additionally, the facts demonstrate that Matrixx acted with 
intentional deceit or recklessness by failing to disclose consumer 
complaints and by making statements about the safety of Zicam.102 
 
 93. Id. at 45. 
 94. Id. at 49. 
 95. Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 51. 
 100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 21–22. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 22. 
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First, because the standard for materiality requires determining 
whether the reasonable investor would consider the omitted facts to 
“significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information made available,”103 
Siracusano emphasizes the necessity of a factual inquiry.104 
Considering this fact-specific determination, materiality should be 
decided on the evidence, not at the pleading stage, and therefore the 
case should proceed to trial.105 The facts show that causation between 
Zicam use and anosmia is more than plausible—doctors (not merely 
consumers alone) have pinpointed a possible connection, patients felt 
a burning feeling after using Zicam, and studies have shown that 
another zinc compound causes anosmia.106 Matrixx had knowledge of 
these facts prior to the commencement of the Class Period and thus 
withheld information that a reasonable investor would find 
significant.107 Additionally, Matrixx misled the public about the extent 
of scientific study on whether Zicam use causes anosmia by making 
affirmative statements that it was safe.108 
Second, Siracusano argues that requiring statistical significance to 
prove materiality would depart from Supreme Court precedent, 
creating an underinclusive materiality determination that leaves out 
numerous considerations that a reasonable investor would deem 
important.109 Statistical significance is a poor indicator of the practical 
importance of information to a reasonable investor because it is not 
error free and does not “incorporate either the magnitude or the 
implications of a study’s result.”110 The statistical significance standard 
is analogous to the bright-line rule rejected in Basic in that a 
categorical rule of statistical significance would allow pharmaceutical 
companies to withhold information that reasonable investors would 
deem significant.111 Although courts should consider statistical 
significance before trial, that standard should not prevent the parties 
from having their day in court because investors consider many 
factors when making a decision.112 
 
 103. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 104. Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 25–26. 
 105. Id. at 27–28. 
 106. Id. at 28–29. 
 107. Id. at 28. 
 108. Id. at 31–32. 
 109. Id. at 39–41. 
 110. Id. at 38–40. 
 111. Id. at 41. 
 112. Id. at 45–47. 
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Siracusano argues that, viewing the allegations as a whole, the 
complaint gives rise to a strong inference of scienter.113 Considering 
Matrixx was “well aware of the potential risk that the doctors’ 
findings posed to its products” and failed to disclose this information, 
an inference that Matrixx intentionally deceived or recklessly 
withheld information is just as compelling as any other inference.114 
Additionally, Matrixx’s statements about Zicam’s “well established” 
safety and its “reluctant admissions” that there was insufficient 
scientific evidence to determine whether Zicam use is linked to 
anosmia, lead to a compelling inference of scienter.115 
The United States supports the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 
Siracusano sufficiently pled materiality and scienter.116 It reiterates 
Siracusano’s position that reasonable investors do not limit 
investment decisions only to information showing a statistically 
significant association between drug use and adverse events.117 The 
government suggests that statistical significance is a limited tool and is 
only one of many that can be used to determine causation.118 Investors 
should not be restricted to statistically significant information because 
information suggesting possible adverse effects can alter investor and 
regulatory behavior, which in turn could affect a company’s share 
price.119 The United States also argues the statistical significance 
standard conflicts with Basic’s emphasis on a factual inquiry and 
rejection of a bright-line rule, and therefore should not bar a trial.120 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the statistical significance 
standard in determining materiality under Rule 10b-5 created a 
circuit split. The Second Circuit first established the statistical 
significance standard in this context in In re Carter-Wallace.121 In 
holding that a drug company was not obligated to disclose deaths 
related to drug use, the Second Circuit stated that adverse-event 
reports need not be disclosed until they show statistically significant 
 
 113. Id. at 34–35. 
 114. Id. at 36. 
 115. Id. at 37. 
 116. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, at 11. 
 117. Id. at 11–12. 
 118. Id. at 13. 
 119. Id. at 17. 
 120. Id. at 22–23. 
 121. In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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evidence of a nonrandom association and are serious enough to affect 
the drug’s prospective earnings.122 The Third Circuit (in an opinion 
authored by then-Judge Alito) subsequently adopted this standard in 
Oran v. Stafford,123 holding that it was not materially misleading to 
withhold data where a causal link had not been conclusively 
ascertained.124 Finally, the First Circuit relied on the statistical 
significance standard to determine that a drug company lacked the 
requisite scienter under Rule 10b-5, assuming that the plaintiffs met 
the materiality standard.125 Thus, due to the Ninth Circuit’s departure 
from the other circuit courts’ decisions, this issue is ripe for 
clarification by the Supreme Court. 
Whether materiality under Rule 10b-5 should require a showing 
of statistical significance rests primarily on how one views the 
corporate disclosure obligations embedded in federal securities laws. 
The most apparent difficulty with this case is that each side’s 
arguments appear to fulfill the purpose behind these laws and Rule 
10b-5 in particular. The standard set forth in TSC Industries states that 
an omission or misstatement is material only where a reasonable 
investor would deem it to “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”126 While the purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to 
encourage the full disclosure of information to shareholders, the 
purpose of the materiality requirement is to weed out insignificant 
and trivial information from a company’s disclosure obligation.127 The 
requirement seeks to encourage companies to be open with their 
investors but, at the same time, not flood them with insignificant 
information that would make it overly burdensome to determine 
what information is important.128 Therefore, there is an inherent 
tension. Matrixx and Siracusano represent opposite sides of this 
tension. Siracusano wants companies to disclose possibly insignificant 
adverse-event reports, whereas Matrixx wants to disclose only 
information that demonstrates a statistically significant link. The 
Supreme Court must decide, therefore, whether requiring disclosure 
of adverse-event reports absent statistical significance ultimately 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 124. Id. at 284. 
 125. N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen Idec Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 47 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
 126. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 127. Id. at 448–49; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988). 
 128. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448–49. 
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would disrupt the delicate balance between disclosing too little and 
disclosing too much information. 
One of the issues raised by this case is the application of scientific 
phenomena to law. The premise of a statistical significance calculation 
is to determine whether two or more events have occurred together 
by chance or whether that occurrence is unlikely to occur randomly.129 
Statistical significance alone does not suggest causation—it indicates 
correlation.130 But where facts do not rise to the level of statistical 
significance, this means a correlative relationship between two events 
is highly unlikely.131 Thus, where adverse-event reports are not 
statistically significant, there is likely no correlation between drug use 
and adverse events—let alone a causal relationship. Theoretically, 
information that is not statistically significant would not have any 
effect on investment decisions because there is no scientifically 
proven basis for concern. 
Despite the apparent applicability of statistical significance to 
whether adverse-event reports are material to investors and should be 
disclosed by pharmaceutical companies, Siracusano argues that the 
imposition of such a standard would depart from Supreme Court 
precedent. Basic’s rejection of a bright-line rule suggests that a rule 
like that proposed by Matrixx would impinge on the factual inquiry 
that must be conducted in determining materiality.132 In this inquiry, 
one should assess whether a reasonable investor would consider 
information important in deciding whether to buy or sell stock. 
Requiring a statistical significance standard at the pleading stage 
would bar cases from trial unless adverse-event reports were 
statistically significant. No other factors relevant to the materiality 
inquiry would be considered absent reaching an initial threshold of 
statistical significance. These factors might include those ensuring that 
safety complaints are legitimate, such as who reported the adverse 
event (i.e., a doctor or a patient) and the type and extent of adverse 
effects, as well as factors suggesting a causal link. This would keep 
many Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs out of court, thus permitting companies to 
not disclose safety issues when investors might want to know about 
them regardless of statistical significance. Matrixx’s argument that 
 
 129. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 34–36. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting a “bright-line rule” 
because materiality is an “inherently fact-specific finding”). 
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investors would not consider adverse-event reports to be material 
unless they showed a statistically significant increase in the rate of 
adverse events might be credible if investors cared only about 
whether the drug actually caused the adverse events. Investors, 
however, care about the market for their shares,133 which is affected by 
many factors, not just whether actual causation exists. Thus, the 
materiality determination does not hinge solely on whether evidence 
of a causal link between drug use and adverse events is available. 
Nevertheless, as alluded to by Justice Scalia in oral argument, it 
seems absurd to determine materiality by deciding what information 
a reasonable investor thinks would cause unreasonable investors to 
do with their shares and how this would affect the market.134 The 
inquiry should be whether a reasonable investor would consider the 
information to “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information.”135 
In other words, would reasonable investors believe that a smattering 
of adverse-event reports is indicative of larger problems within a 
pharmaceutical company? The statistical significance standard  would 
provide investors in pharmaceutical companies with information that 
they could know has some substance to it—information that would 
provide a meaningful basis for concern about the company’s state of 
affairs. 
Given the Basic Court’s rejection of relying on a bright-line rule 
to determine whether information is material under Rule 10b-5, it 
probably will affirm the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of requiring 
statistical significance to show materiality. If required, this standard 
would bar many plaintiffs from reaching the factual inquiry that is 
required for determining materiality. Factors other than the statistical 
significance of adverse events are relevant to investment decisions 
affecting the market. Thus, adverse-event reports that fail to 
demonstrate statistically significant causal links between drug use and 
adverse events may be material nevertheless, and corporations might 
need to disclose them to shareholders. 
Although both sides have strong arguments in their favor, 
 
 133. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No. 09-
1156 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2010) (Chief Justice Roberts noted that if he were an investor in Matrixx, he 
would “worry whether [his] stock price is going to go down.”). 
 134. See id. at 39 (“[I]t seems to me ridiculous to . . . hold companies to . . . irrational 
standards.”). But see id. at 16 (“A reasonable investor is going to worry about the fact that 
thousands of unreasonable investors are going to dump their Matrixx stock.”) (Roberts, C.J.). 
 135. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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Siracusano likely will prevail. Whereas Matrixx argues for a clearer 
rule that would provide investors with a legitimate basis for concern 
when information about adverse events is disclosed,136 Siracusano’s 
rule more clearly adheres to Supreme Court precedent.137 It 
encourages pharmaceutical companies to disclose more information 
to their investors—information that reasonable investors would 
consider relevant in their decision-making process.138 
At oral argument, the Court focused on determining why it should 
apply the statistical significance standard and whether factors other 
than statistical significance matter, perhaps indicating a preference for 
proceeding with a factual inquiry rather than applying a hard-and-fast 
rule. The Court also attempted to discern where the boundary 
between materiality and nonmateriality would lie in cases involving 
adverse-event reports absent a statistical significance standard. This 
suggests that the Court may seek to clarify the law without imposing 
the strict standard of statistical significance. 
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan appeared to dislike the idea of imposing statistical significance 
as a matter of law and were skeptical of why the Court should not 
permit cases to proceed straight to trial. The Chief Justice emphasized 
that the causal link between Zicam and anosmia would not be the 
sole issue about which investors would be concerned, and that the 
relevant consideration includes how different types of information 
will affect the market.139 Questioning why the Court should not just 
allow cases such as this to proceed to a factual determination at trial, 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor also implied that information other 
than mere statistical data would be important to investors, including 
information about who reports the adverse events and the substance 
of these complaints.140 Justice Kagan suggested that investors would 
 
 136. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 44 (“Statistical significance also gives both 
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[adverse event reports] . . . .”). 
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still want to know about adverse events even in situations where the 
events are not statistically significant but nonetheless suggest a causal 
link.141 Justice Kagan also noted that the FDA looks to other factors 
than statistical significance, not requiring adverse-event reports to 
demonstrate a statistically significant increase in adverse events 
before it initiates an investigation or issues warning letters.142 
Rejecting the statistical significance standard during oral argument, 
Justice Breyer suggested that lack of scientific proof does not mean 
that something is not significant.143 He explained that many great 
scientific theories are relevant and important before they are 
empirically proven.144 
Even assuming the statistical significance standard would be the 
only issue important to investors, several Justices appeared to reject 
the standard for other reasons. Justice Breyer inferred that judges do 
not know when adverse-event reports suggest something important 
about the company, and so should not impose a strict standard.145 
Congress, Justice Breyer intimated, should institute the statistical 
significance standard if it believes that standard adequately reflects 
when information is material to investors.146 Justice Sotomayor 
pointed to Matrixx’s apparent concession that the statistical 
significance standard cannot be absolute in all circumstances.147 
Appearing to support the statistical significance standard, Justices 
Scalia and Alito most likely would side with Matrixx. Justice Scalia 
appeared to reject the idea that companies should have to be 
concerned with how irrational or unreasonable investors would react 
when disclosing information, saying that is not what the Court meant 
in Basic.148 Both Justices Scalia and Alito questioned what sort of 
affirmative statements a company must make to trigger a duty to 
disclose the adverse-event reports.149 Chief Justice Roberts also 
expressed some qualms about rejecting the standard and suggested 
that pharmaceutical companies would have difficulty keeping 
 
and then we can know how many reports there really were?”) (Ginsburg, J.); id. at 8. 
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unmeritorious suits from going to trial absent the statistical 
significance standard.150 
Given Basic’s rejection of a “bright-line rule” when determining 
the materiality of information for purposes of securities-disclosure 
requirements, the Court probably will hold that Matrixx’s proposed 
statistical significance standard is too rigid for the analysis and side 
with Siracusano. Many adverse-event reports are made directly to the 
pharmaceutical company and might not be known to plaintiffs prior 
to discovery, which enables plaintiffs to learn about problems that 
might be necessary to establishing a statistically significant 
correlation. If the Court required plaintiffs to show statistical 
significance as a threshold matter, many litigants would never have 
the information necessary to allege the facts required under this 
standard. 
Additionally, the Court has deferred to the SEC in the past when 
interpreting federal securities laws and rules, and the SEC supports 
Siracusano’s position here. The Court will likely defer again to the 
SEC’s judgment and hold that the materiality of adverse events does 
not require showing statistical significance.151 Given his decision in 
Oran v. Stafford,152 Justice Alito, along with Justice Scalia, however, 
likely will dissent in favor of requiring plaintiffs to show statistical 
significance to meet Rule 10b-5’s materiality requirement. 
In sum, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano concerns whether 
adverse events reported to a drug company constitute material 
information that must be disclosed to shareholders under SEA 
section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Matrixx argues that to be material 
information, adverse-event reports must provide statistically 
significant evidence of a causal relationship between drug use and 
adverse events.153 Siracusano maintains that determining whether 
information is material requires a factual inquiry that would be 
barred in many cases by the imposition of the statistical significance 
standard.154 The First, Second, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal 
have applied the statistical significance standard to this materiality 
determination, requiring adverse-event reports to demonstrate 
statistically significant evidence of a nonrandom link between drug 
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use and adverse events.155 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, 
rejected this standard.156 The Supreme Court most likely will resolve 
this split by affirming the Ninth Circuit’s holding and rejecting the 
statistical significance standard as a departure from the Basic Court’s 
emphasis on a comprehensive factual determination. 
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